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Forthcoming, in Brett Christophers, Geoff Mann and Andrew Leyshon (eds.) (2016) Money and 
Finance after the Crisis: Critical Thinking for Uncertain Times, Wiley-Blackwell 
 
 
Financial Flows: Spatial Imaginaries of Speculative Circulations 
 
Paul Langley 
 
Introduction: from chain to spinning top 
 
Amidst the unfolding of the recent global financial crisis, ‘complexity’ was widely posited to 
be a significant causal factor by practitioners, policymakers and media commentators 
(Christophers 2009; Datz 2013). By way of simplification and visualisation, assertions that 
global finance was collapsing under the weight of its own complexity were often 
accompanied by a particular set of maps. Dating from the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
maps in question were flow diagrams – typically composed of boxes and arrows, variously 
coloured and arranged - representing the innovative techniques of asset-backed securitisation 
and their associated array of capital market and derivative instruments. Coming to 
prominence during the turmoil, these techniques and instruments were supposed to 
‘complete’ and ‘perfect’ the markets by enabling the widespread distribution of the default 
risks of sub-prime mortgage lending, but only succeeded in exacerbating ‘systemic risk’ 
(Langley 2008a, 2013). Maps of the so-called ‘securitisation chain’ thus became a ubiquitous 
feature of the demystifications of the crisis offered by policy and media reports, even 
featuring in the 2010 Oscar-winning documentary film, Inside Job.  
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As Ismail Erturk and his co-authors suggest, the mapping of this now notorious feature of the 
global financial market landscape as a chain was significant, not least because the chain was 
much more than a useful descriptive device for bringing the complexities of global finance 
down to earth (Erturk et al. 2011).  It also ‘encouraged the view that securitization was akin 
to a regular production system that transformed raw inputs - in this case mortgages or other 
loans - into final products, which were sold on to investors at the end of the production chain’ 
(Erturk et al. 2011: 581). Indeed, the visualisation of securitisation as a productive and 
ordered process - ‘linear flows with a beginning, middle and end’ (p. 582) - had been ‘an 
important influence on light-touch regulatory prescriptions’ which assisted financial market 
innovation prior to the crisis (p. 581).  
 
In place of the flow diagrams of the securitisation chain, and taking inspiration from Michel 
Serres' writings on the appearance of turbulence in the physics of energy and heat flows, 
Erturk et al. (2011) propose a pair of altogether more illuminating metaphors for envisioning 
securitisation and global financial flows more broadly. For them, the metaphors of ‘circuit’ 
and ‘spinning top’ provide effective concepts for opening-up some of the important dynamics 
of financial flows. In contrast with a linear chain, thinking in terms of a circuit emphasizes 
return loops over directional flows; ‘everyone gets paid as long as there is throughput in the 
circuit’ (p. 586). And, by adding the metaphor of the child’s toy, a spinning top, Erturk et al. 
underscore the importance of circulatory ‘throughput’ by reminding us that ‘finance requires 
momentum to remain stable’ (p. 586). This is because when flows grind to a halt, as was the 
case in the crisis, then the edifice of global finance begins to spin-off in highly unpredictable 
and destabilising directions.   
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Erturk et al.’s (2011) attention to the role of the securitisation chain as an imaginary of global 
financial flows, and their re-envisioning of securitisation techniques as circuit and spinning 
top, echoes previous interventions by social scientists. Recall, for example, J.K Gibson-
Graham’s (1996: 135-7) proposal to re-think money and finance as ‘the seminal fluid of 
capitalism’, and to thereby stress how the excesses of ‘the body of capitalism’ periodically 
become manifest in ‘a spasm of uncontrollability and unboundedness’. Gordon Clark (2005), 
meanwhile, draws our attention to how the metaphorical mapping of global financial markets 
typically conjures-up a relatively smooth space of watery flows that can be channelled and 
directed, rather than the embedded realities of uneven geographies which are produced by the 
inherent tendency for finance to concentrate in key urban centres. For Clark, it is ‘mercury’ 
rather than water that provides an illuminating metaphor for understanding global financial 
flows, not least because ‘mercury pools by its very nature’ (p. 104). The ostensible watery 
qualities of financial flows - creating the impression that markets operate as ‘hydraulic 
systems’ that function to irrigate the ‘real’ economic landscape – also provide the focus for 
Anne Mayhew’s (2011) analysis of the mid-twentieth century development of flow-of-funds 
accounting by the Federal Reserve. With clear parallels to Erturk et al.’s intervention, 
Mayhew recovers a debate that turned on whether the movements that practitioner 
accountants were attempting to capture as a flow-of-funds were more akin to circuits of 
electricity than to streams and rivers.      
 
Such provocations to interrogate critically the spatial imaginaries of financial flows provide 
the starting point for this chapter. Here, though, I want to take inquiry in two underexplored 
directions. First, the chapter asks a different kind of conceptual question from the 
provocations discussed above. Rather than highlighting that which is elided through an 
established imaginary (e.g. chain) and proposing a corrective metaphorical concept (e.g. 
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spinning top), I want ask how the generative force of spatial imaginaries might be understood 
in the context of long-standing conceptual debates that identify speculative circulations as a 
defining, geographical feature of financial markets. Erturk et al. (2011) allude to such debates 
when they propose the metaphors of circuit and spinning top, but I bring them into the 
foreground here. In short, I want to ask how the constitutive contribution of spatial 
imaginaries to the production and reproduction of speculative circulations can be 
conceptualised and analysed. Second, I want to draw analytical attention to a trope present 
within and across prevailing spatial imaginaries that, coming to the surface during the global 
financial crisis in the USA and UK particular, envisions financial flows as vital and essential 
to contemporary life. This trope is politically significant because it helps establish the limits 
within which debate and disagreement over the future of financial flows takes place. Once 
speculative circulations appear to be fundamental to securing wealth and wellbeing - despite 
the insecurity produced by their volatilities and vicissitudes – political debate itself takes on a 
circular quality in which there appears to be no alternative to what Michel Foucault (2007: 
49) terms the ‘freedom of circulation’.  
 
The chapter proceeds in three main sections. As the opening section briefly reviews, critical 
understandings of finance in the contemporary social sciences are marked by an analytical 
concern with the circulatory and speculative qualities of their problem-object. While they 
also hold out some promising avenues through which to consider how speculative 
circulations are actually produced and reproduced, at present they tend not to pay particular 
analytical attention to the constitutive work which is accomplished by spatial imaginaries. 
The second section suggests Georg Simmel’s century-old contribution to the social theory of 
money can begin to provide a conceptual basis from which to analyse the constitutive 
relationships between spatial imaginaries and speculative circulations. The very idea of 
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money and its mobility was crucial to Simmel’s (2004) account of the role of money in the 
making of a particular modern and urban ‘style of life’ at the turn of the twentieth-century. In 
a similar manner, imaginaries of speculative and uncertain financial circulations can be seen 
as necessary to the privileged positioning of ‘the markets’ in the making of a valued form of 
Anglo-American, neo-liberal life during the first decades of the twenty-first century. The 
third and final section focuses on three particular spatial imaginaries of the speculative 
circulations of global finance that loomed large in the governance of the recent crisis; 
namely, the ‘liquidity’ of money markets, the ‘toxicity’ of capital markets, and the ‘casino’ 
practices of banking.           
 
Speculative circulations 
 
As post-Keynesian economists Massimo Amato and Luca Fantacci (2012) highlight, the 
meanings ascribed to ‘finance’ are often misleading with regard to its temporal-spatial 
dynamics. The etymology of ‘finance’ can be traced to the old French terms fin (end) and 
finer (to make an end, settle debt), and to the English fine (a monetary penalty). Similarly, in 
contemporary usage the verb 'to finance' usually refers to borrowed monetary resources, 
especially as they are used to fund purchases and investments. What ‘finance’ usually 
invokes, in short, is the two-way flow of a credit-debt relation: credit-money is received, on 
the one hand, and requires debt (principal and interest) repayment over some period of time, 
on the other. However, Amato and Fantacci emphasise a notable feature of the temporality of 
financial relations: when viewed in the aggregate, such relations are never settled, they do not 
end. Indeed, as the rapid and on-going expansion of the volume of outstanding household, 
corporate and sovereign debt in recent decades so vividly attests (Pettifor 2006), the opposite 
would seem to be case.  
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Moreover, Amato and Fantacci’s (2012) analysis reveals the especially intriguing ways in 
which the contemporary burgeoning of financial relations without foreseeable end is 
intimately bound-up with the changing spatiality of those relations. Through careful 
examination of a series of historical developments – most notably, the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed-exchange rates and capital controls - Amato and Fantacci show that 
the business of wholesale finance has progressively become dominated less by the creation of 
credit-debt relations in primary markets, and more by the commodification of credit-debt 
relations and their risk attributes in secondary and derivative markets. In sum, for Amato and 
Fantacci, contemporary finance without foreseeable end is characterised by the trading of 
exchangeable and transferable claims upon the future, and by geographies of speculative 
circulations which are fundamentally different to the two-way flows of a credit-debt relation.   
 
Those writing in the Marxist political economy tradition may well be sceptical of Amato and 
Fantacci’s (2012) claims about the novelty of contemporary developments (e.g. Arrighi 
1994), but they would likely agree with their characterisation of the temporal-spatial 
character of finance. Consider, for example, Brett Christophers’ (2009) intervention into 
debates over the complexity of contemporary finance. As he works towards an analysis that 
takes inspiration from David Harvey’s (1982) theoretical development of Marx, Christophers 
(2009: 817) makes the following observation: 
 
Much of the perceived complexity in modern finance stems … from the fact that the 
credit relationship rarely remains, in this day and age, a simple binary one. In other 
words, it is seldom the case that where money is lent by A to B, only A and B remain 
parties to the money in question: for B will frequently lend that same money on in one 
way or another, and the loan that A has made to B will itself often be passed on in the 
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form of a new credit instrument. Multiple credit instruments and relationships, 
therefore, but only one underlying pool of money. 
 
In Harvey’s (1982) analysis, the ‘multiple credit instruments and relationships’ that comprise 
financial flows occupy a position in the circuits of capitalism which is, at once, essential and 
destabilising. He posits, for instance, that ‘the circulation of interest-bearing capital performs 
certain vital functions and the accumulation of capital therefore requires that money 
capitalists achieve and actively assert themselves as a power external to and independent of 
actual production processes’ (p. 261, original emphasis). There are, for Harvey, six such 
‘functions’ (pp. 262-72). Banking and finance: (1) mobilise money that would otherwise lay 
idle; (2) provide credit that accelerates trade and the circulation of commodities; (3) increase 
the rate of commodity production through fixed investment; (4) facilitate the formation of 
‘fictitious capital’ (wherein credit is extended indefinitely as re-saleable ownership claims 
that are always waiting to be realised, i.e. stocks and shares); (5) encourage the equalization 
of profit rates across the economy because of ‘flows in response to profit rate differentials’ 
(p. 270), and; (6) embolden the dynamism of capitalism by assisting the centralization and 
restructuring of capital. In return for the performance of these vital functions, banking and 
finance extract rent in the form of the appropriation of interest. In the first instance and in 
aggregate, then, the movements and machinations of finance capital under capitalism are 
understood primarily in terms of the two-way flows of the power relation of credit-debt.    
 
At the same time, a feature of the theoretical development of Marx offered by Harvey (1982: 
283) is that pre-capitalist tendencies for money lending to be largely usurious and parasitical - 
tendencies ‘which Marx was aware of but brushes aside’ (p. 257) - continue to be present in 
his account of the place of finance capital within capitalism. When understanding finance 
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capital as ‘a process, as opposed to a particular set of institutional arrangements or a 
catalogue of who is dominating whom within the bourgeoisie’, Harvey highlights a number 
of ‘circumstances’ and ‘barriers’ that prevent it from ‘functioning as a fine-tuner of 
accumulation’ (p. 287). These include the persistent tendency for money capital to be 
‘indiscriminate as to its uses since it typically flows to appropriate revenues of no matter 
what sort’ (p. 287). Although the two-way circulation of interest-bearing capital is thus 
crucial to the disciplinary power and dynamism of the credit-debt relation in capitalism (see 
also Lazzarato 2015), for Harvey it remains the case that ‘there is nothing to prevent 
speculative investment in the appropriation of revenues from getting entirely out of hand’ (p. 
287). The result is that capitalism is characterised not only by a ‘surface froth of perpetual 
speculation’ (p. 325), but also by tendencies to ‘speculative fever’ which periodically come to 
dominate as a discernible phase in the ups-and-downs of the ‘accumulation cycle’ (p. 303). 
The speculative passions and flows of finance capital that Harvey identifies are not, however, 
a simple destabilising force within capitalism. As refined in his later work, speculative 
circuits are understood by Harvey (2001) to be capable of providing a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ 
for the contradictions of capitalism. By switching excess capital into secondary circuits and 
establishing claims upon specific urban property markets during a particular conjuncture, for 
example, finance capital is able to paper over the cracks of crisis-prone capitalism. Such fixes 
remain necessarily temporary, however, as they also serve to widen the reach and deepen the 
intensity of capitalism’s destabilising contradictions.        
 
The post-Keynesian and Marxist political economy traditions can thus be seen to leave us in 
little doubt: aggregate financial flows are not merely the cumulative result of two-party 
credit-debt relations, but necessarily also include the speculative circulations of transferable 
claims on the future. Put baldly, much of the flow of finance which passes as necessary for 
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the operation of the ‘real economy’ of production and consumption – and, increasingly, for 
the provision of the ‘public goods’ of urban infrastructure (e.g. transportation, energy, waste, 
communication) (Allen and Pryke 2013; O’Neill 2010, this volume), and even the 
preservation of liveable environments for future generations (Sullivan 2012) - is actually 
speculative circulations.    
 
Furthermore, as it pin-points the speculative quality of financial flows with considerable 
clarity, Marxist political economy also holds that the conditions of possibility for speculative 
circulations are systemic to capitalism. To paraphrase Harvey (1982: 261), speculative 
circulations are an inevitable consequence of the ‘power external to and independent of actual 
production processes’ that ‘money capitalists’ are required to ‘achieve and actively assert’. It 
follows that the contemporary pervasiveness of the speculative circulations which encircle 
the globe is largely a consequence of the particular achievements and assertions of power by 
finance capital, in the USA in particular (e.g. Gowan 1999; Panitch and Gindin 2013). 
However, if we look beyond post-Keynesianism and Marxist political economy to the plural, 
critical understandings of finance which are also present in the social sciences, we find that 
analytical emphasis is typically placed upon an array of contingent conditions that might also 
be said to make speculative circulations possible. A number of conceptual routes for 
analysing the processes and practices that produce speculative circulations are opened up, for 
example, by the recent calls to draw together cultural economy concepts with over two 
decades worth of research into the geographies of money and finance (Hall 2011, Langley 
2016).  
 
Reflecting its core concern with how relatively discrete and variegated financial markets are 
assembled through socio-technical and material processes (e.g. MacKenzie 2009), what 
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cultural economy suggests is that economic formulas, models and other calculative devices 
play a crucial role in making the more-or-less discrete appropriations of speculative 
circulation possible. This may help put some flesh on the bones of Maurizio Lazzarato’s 
(2015: 43) recent claim that rent - as an apparatus that appropriates and captures value in 
ways distinct from the apparatuses of profit and taxation – is an ‘accounting machine’ that 
includes its own ‘criteria for evaluation and comparison, its own measurements, and its own 
property regime’. And, if the dynamic category of ‘value’ is held to be the foundational and 
‘organising principle of capital’ (Mann 2010a: 175), then it follows that recognising the 
contingent constitutive force of economic formulas, models and devices is critical to 
explaining how the rent-like appropriations of speculative circulations come to figure so 
positively in the prevailing value regime (Cooper and Konings 2015). At a minimum, while 
post-Keynesian and Marxist political economy foreground the speculative qualities of 
financial flows, cultural economy accounts of financial markets certainly help to deepen 
understanding of the contingent socio-technical and material conditions which make 
speculative circulations possible.     
 
If we take analytical insights from geographic research into the significance of financial 
centres, meanwhile, there is clearly also a sense in which the conditions and processes that 
sustain speculative circulations are place-based. Once financial centres are understood as 
crucibles of financial information, trust and knowledge/power (Clark 2005; Lee 2011; Thrift 
1994), for instance, then the speculative circulations of finance can be understood to be 
manufactured, directed and made meaningful through calculative and interpretative practices 
in such centres. And, as ethnographic research into the workplaces of the City of London and 
Wall Street highlights (Ho 2009; McDowell 1997), the production of speculative circulations 
can also be understood as an embodied process, requiring the calling-forth and performance 
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of particular subjectivities. In the contemporary City, for example, it is clear that much has 
changed from the era of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ (Augar 2000), but it remains unclear at 
present what the recent crisis means for the exuberant and aggressive masculine subjectivity 
of the valorised market trader of recent decades (Hall and Appleyard 2012). This is especially 
the case given the rise of high-frequency trading and the role of algorithms in trading 
strategies (MacKenzie et al. 2012), and the associated valorisation of the embodied 
mathematical knowledge of so-called ‘quants’ (Patterson 2011). The present moment would 
seem to require a more thorough questioning of the embodied processes through which 
speculative circulations become possible (Borch, Hansen and Lange 2015), especially as 
unfold in financial centres and workplaces. 
 
What this brief review of critical social scientific research makes plain, in sum, is that 
speculative circulations are an inherent feature of capitalist finance, and that the analysis of 
how these circulations are made possible in different contexts should consider configurations 
of class and sovereign power and the complex concentrations of economic knowledge and 
gendered embodied work which take place in global financial centres. It remains the case, 
however, that the knowledge and practices of finance which tend to be addressed by existing 
research are largely confined to expert knowledge and professional practices. There is limited 
attention to the highly-mediated perceptions and dispositions concerning the uses and 
circulations of finance that travel and spread throughout contemporary societies (de Goede 
2012). As Urs Stäheli (2013) argues, with reference to the USA between the 1870s and 1930s 
- a context in which financial markets first began to take on enormous importance in 
mainstream culture – the spectacle of speculation is translated into popular knowledges and 
discourses in ways that are crucial to sustaining and legitimating its circulations. This is 
arguably intensified in the contemporary period, when the fluctuations and undulations of 
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‘the markets’ have become the basic feedstock of a ‘finance-entertainment complex’ 
operating in real-time (Taylor 2004: 191; also Clark, Thrift and Tickell 2004). Although it 
places the speculative qualities of financial flows to the front-and-centre of analysis and 
provides significant insights for exploring their constitution, critical social science presently 
gives little analytical weight to the force and play of spatial imaginaries when accounting for 
the production and reproduction of speculative circulations. In the following section, I turn to 
the social theory of money to begin to provide a conceptual basis from which to analyse the 
constitutive relationships between spatial imaginaries and speculative circulations.             
 
Spatial imaginaries 
 
Originally published in 1907, Georg Simmel’s (2004) The Philosophy of Money is widely 
regarded as a principal contribution to the classical social theory of money. The prevailing 
contemporary reading of this text follows Zelizer’s (1994) influential critique and positions 
Simmel - alongside Marx, Weber and others - as a theorist who emphasises money’s 
calculative quality as a means of accounting that renders things commensurate (e.g. Gilbert 
2005). For Simmel, it is the circulation of the quantifications of money which are crucial to 
understanding how ‘a coherent world of value’ - where value appears as an objective property 
of objects themselves - can emerge through the interplay of ‘subjective desire’ and 
‘intersubjective processes of exchange’ (Dodd 2014: 27-9). Yet, the operation of money is, 
for Simmel, not solely understood as the circulation of a pure instrument of quantitative 
valuation (Dodd 1994, 2014). Rather, the circulation of money also carries with it the very 
idea of money; that is, the symbolic meanings and associations necessarily attached to 
money. It is in these terms that Simmel probes the relations between money in circulation and 
the ‘individual freedoms’ of an emerging modern, metropolitan ‘style of life’ at the turn of 
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the twentieth-century. By ‘uniting people while excluding everything personal and specific’ 
(Simmel 2004: 347), both monetary calculation and the idea of money are crucial to the 
loosening of social bonds and the flattening of social hierarchies, as all things and desires 
come to appear to be available at a price.         
 
For John Allen and Michael Pryke (1999), the emphasis Simmel places on the idea of money 
and its contribution to modern social life provides a critical vantage point from which to 
understand how the time-spaces of contemporary global financial flows are produced and 
reproduced. To extend Simmel’s insights, Allen and Pryke make two principal conceptual 
moves in the context of classical and contemporary writings on the social theory of money. 
First, while Simmel devoted his analytical attention somewhat narrowly to the circulation of 
money as currency in a world of exchange, Allen and Pryke conceive money and finance 
more broadly. This follows from a number of different perspectives found in the 
contemporary social theory of money. Here ‘money’, in the first instance, is a means of 
accounting and sustaining the uncertain promises to pay of credit-debt relations rather than an 
enabler of exchange (Ingham 2004; Lazzarato 2012). The claims and obligations of credit-
debt themselves become transferable, and can be represented as financial instruments to be 
speculated upon in the markets, because they are denominated in a shared money of account.      
 
Second, Allen and Pryke (1999) develop and elaborate upon Simmel’s concerns with the idea 
of money through the categories of ‘money imaginary’ and ‘cultures of money’ (see Dodd 
1994). While Simmel sought to understand how the idea of money produced a particular 
‘style of life’ somewhat specific to metropolitan Berlin, for Allen and Pryke there are 
multiple imaginaries that make the contemporary movements of money and finance 
meaningful and which contribute to multiple money cultures. As they have it, with 
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derivatives in particular, ‘it is not the instruments so much that are of concern’, but ‘the ideas 
about what they may facilitate and what different groups of people in locations distant from 
one another imagine themselves to be involved in’ (p. 52). It follows that the shared 
meanings of ‘money cultures’ are ‘lived, experienced, and interpreted by particular groups in 
particular places at particular times’, and are ‘made up of people who position themselves in 
relation to the circulation of money and are also positioned by it’ (p. 65). What specific 
monetary and financial circulations are taken to mean thus influences not only actions and 
responses, but the formation of subjectivities (see Langley and Leyshon 2012).  
 
Allen and Pryke’s (1999) second conceptual move runs somewhat counter to that which is 
typically made in the contemporary social theory of money. Following Zelizer’s (1994) 
intervention (see Dodd 2014: 286-294), monies in use and circulating alongside of each other 
are typically held to be acted on and ‘ear-marked’. In short, according to the contemporary 
social theory of money, the circulation of money is not simply a corrosive force that wipes 
away social bonds. Rather, it is said to be subject to cultural pressures and processes which 
can ensure that, when it is in use, money is employed in ways that are largely consistent with 
existing identities and interests. For Allen and Pryke (1999: 65), in contrast, there can be ‘no 
endless play of money cultures’. This is because, grounded in Simmel’s assertion that the 
circulation of money also carries with it the very idea of money, money is always already a 
spatial imaginary and a culture. It is not a thing that, empty of meaning at the outset, can be 
culturally or politically ear-marked when put to use. There may well be a ‘diversity of 
cultural interpretations related to movement and mobility’ which are of constitutive 
significance to the circulations of monies (p. 65). But, amidst this diversity are prevailing 
imaginaries that, stressing the crucial role of money and finance in modern social 
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relationships, hold a particular and pervasive generative force that contributes to sustaining 
monetary and financial circulations and summoning up monetary and financial subjectivities.  
 
Rooted in Simmel’s concern with the symbolic meanings and associations always already 
attached to modern money, and extended through Allen and Pryke’s (1999) prescient 
contribution, what can be said of how spatial imaginaries provide conditions of possibility for 
speculative circulations? The primary focus for Allen and Pryke’s (1999) own analysis is 
derivative markets, and thus upon how imaginaries of the mobility of money in those markets 
give meaning to elite, professional practices in the financial centres where these markets are 
located. As they have it, the symbolic marking of derivative circulations by their pace and 
simultaneity ‘positions many of those working in finance in a culture of fast risk and 
effortless gain’ (p. 62). Allen and Pryke (1999) are also careful to differentiate the particular 
culture of derivatives markets from the popular culture of global finance that, they suggest, 
has taken hold in recent decades and provides ‘a wider circuit of meaning’ for ‘personal 
finance’ in the USA and UK in particular (p. 64). As they have it, quoting terms from 
Simmel, today’s popular culture of finance features a spatial imaginary that is characterised 
by ‘”restless flow”’ and ‘“effortless multiplication”’, such that ‘a world of derivatives and 
speculative gain’ appears to be ‘not restricted to a handful of dealers in the world's financial 
centres’ (p. 64).  
 
The presence and play of spatial imaginaries of speculative circulations in everyday life 
which Allen and Pryke (1999) highlight can be understood, moreover, as a manifestation of 
the biopolitical mode of power and security that Foucault (2007, 2008) identified in his later 
work (Langley 2015). For Foucault (2007), one of the features that distinguishes biopolitical 
power from other modalities (i.e. sovereignty and discipline) is the way in which it configures 
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and seeks to act upon circulations. Circulations of ‘people, merchandise, and air etcetera’ 
may well be uncertain and pose dangers (p. 29), but it is apparently upon these very 
circulations and their contingencies that the dynamic and entrepreneurial production of 
wealth, health and happiness rests (Foucault 2008). With a clear parallel to Simmel’s account 
of the role of the idea of money in the making of a modern and urban ‘style of life’ at the turn 
of the twentieth-century, on these terms the last three-to-four decades have seen uncertain 
financial market circulations come to be understood as vital to securing a valued form of neo-
liberal life. 
 
As constituted through the prevailing spatial imaginary, the ostensible significance of 
speculative circulations to contemporary socio-economic life does not simply turn on their 
growing contribution to economic growth (Christophers 2013), or on finance’s continuously 
asserted role of providing investment that is said to nourish the ‘real economy’ of production 
and employment. Rather, what is especially notable is how this spatial imaginary figures the 
close interrelations that have developed between the saving and borrowing of everyday life in 
Anglo-America, on the one hand, and the speculative circulations of global financial markets, 
on the other (Langley 2008b). The rise of mutual fund stock market investment has 
increasingly displaced retail deposit saving and collective retirement insurance. In 
consequence, security now seems to turn less than previously upon thrifty provision for the 
future and the calculation, pooling, and spreading of uncertainties as ‘risks’. Instead, it now 
appears to turn on the entrepreneurial embrace of the risks and uncertainties of financial 
circulations, accompanied by the de-politicization of the unequal distribution of rewards. At 
the same time, relatively unencumbered access to mortgage and consumer credit would now 
seem to play a positive role in facilitating the prosperity of all. The result, as Lazzarato (2012: 
94) argues, is that the management of debt - alongside the management of precarious 
17 
 
employability, falls in real wages, and the shrinking availability of public services – now 
characterises the lived experience of (in)security for the majority. But, imagined as vital and 
essential to contemporary life, finance and its speculations remain free-flowing and largely 
unencumbered by the kinds of restrictions and regulations that were in place four decades 
ago.    
       
The governance of the global financial crisis   
 
One method for analysing how highly-mediated spatial imaginaries envision speculative 
circulations as essential to contemporary life is to interrogate how these imaginaries come to 
the surface during moments of crisis, featuring in particular in the interventions that seek to 
render and govern crises. This is clearly a somewhat different form of inquiry to that which, 
inspired by Marxist political economy, posits the ‘vital functions’ (Harvey 1982) of financial 
flows within capitalism and seeks to explore various attempts by central banks, treasuries and 
regulators aimed at restoring those circulations (e.g. Epstein and Wolfson 2013). For the 
latter form of inquiry, the spatial imaginaries of financial flows which are present in 
governmental interventions would not seem likely to be accorded analytical weight as 
generative forces in their own right. Yet, one of the notable features of crises is that they are 
not governed as crises of finance and capitalism, tout court, but through relatively discrete 
technical problematisations in which the rendering of issues of circulation looms large 
(Langley 2015). At a general level, for example, crises of banking and finance are typically 
defined in economic theory and practice as ‘liquidity crises’ (Allen et al. 2011). Whether 
finding form as a ‘run’ by depositors on a fractional reserve bank, for instance, or as a rupture 
in money and capital market flows, it is a ‘liquidity squeeze’ that is typically held to be the 
essential and defining feature of a financial crisis.  
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To take a more specific example, consider the spatial imaginary that prevailed in the 
governance of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8. Here the technical problem that was 
fabricated and managed was ‘international capital mobility’. This spatial imaginary was 
crucial to the governance of the crisis by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
international financial institutions (IFIs). State-imposed capital controls to restrict disruptive 
cross-border flows, or transaction taxes to slow capital flows within and between markets, 
were both eschewed by the IFIs on the grounds that such measures interrupted the capacity of 
global finance to provide vital flows for ‘real’ economic investment (Watson 2007; Gallagher 
2015). What emerged from the crisis for the IFIs was a developmental agenda that called for 
the more careful ‘sequencing’ of financial reform, wherein the deregulation of domestic 
financial systems preceded the removal of capital controls which remained necessary to 
enable the benefits of free-flowing finance (Langley 2004; see Lai and Daniels, this volume). 
 
In the governance of the global financial crisis that began in the autumn of 2007, meanwhile, 
the figuring of the technical problems to be addressed featured an array of spatial imaginaries 
of speculative circulations. In the Anglo-American heartland of the crisis in particular, these 
imaginaries were notable for the ways in which they construed anything less than the full 
restoration of circulations as a fundamental threat to the security of the population. What was 
to be secured through crisis governance was not merely the markets, the banks, and the 
financing of the ‘real economy’ they are said to provide for, but popular stock market 
investment and privatized pensions, on the one hand, and expanded and widespread 
availability of mortgage loans and consumer credit, on the other. Restoring the uncertain 
circulations of finance and banking was figured, in short, as a matter of security, an urgent 
need to refurbish a particular and valued form of Anglo-American, neo-liberal life. To 
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paraphrase Harvey (2011: 7), it was not that ‘everyone in power recognized’ the crisis as ‘a 
matter of life and death for capital’, but that there was a tendency for the crisis to be 
rationalized and strategized as a threat to the security of life itself.       
 
Take, for example, how during the first twelve months or so the crisis was made legible and 
governed as a problem of ‘liquidity’. As noted above, crises of banking and finance are 
typically defined in economic theory and practice as ‘liquidity crises’. As such, it was no 
surprise when the media consistently iterated the global financial crisis as a situation in which 
liquidity had ‘evaporated’ from markets which were also said to have ‘dried up’, ‘seized up’ 
or ‘frozen over’; or that the Federal Reserve's and the Bank of England's complex and 
unprecedented last resort lending interventions were cast as ‘pumping’ or ‘injecting 
liquidity’. The markets in question were the money and capital markets: in money markets, 
banks and other institutions were unable to access short-term debt or renew (‘roll-over’) 
outstanding obligations; in capital markets, there were few buyers, as institutions sought to 
off-load vast portfolios of assets related to and derived from sub-prime mortgages. That the 
purchase of capital market assets had tended to be funded through the money markets only 
compounded the issue.  
 
Yet, governing the crisis as a technical problem of liquidity also had a number of wider 
symbolic and cultural resonances. To recall the provocations of Clark (2005) and Mayhew 
(2011) noted at the outset, the watery spatial imaginary of liquidity conjures the circulations 
of finance in a particular way: markets appear as functioning to provide the flows essential to 
the irrigation of the ‘real’ economic landscape. Prior to the crisis, the spatial imaginary of 
liquidity had become something of a totem for the innovations that had supposedly 
‘completed’ and ‘perfected’ the markets (Cooper 2014). As Pasanek and Polillo (2011: 232-
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3) note, ‘liquidity’ borrows from broader representations of markets which gives ‘flows of 
currency and credit the appearance of a natural and automatic process’, and thereby 
‘reinforces laissez-faire models of equilibrium and circulation’. As such, when the crisis hit, 
the liquidity of markets appeared as ‘the prerequisite for the very possibility of credit’ 
(Amato and Fantacci 2012: 24). It followed from this spatial imaginary of financial 
circulation that the so-called ‘credit crunch’ acutely experienced by firms and domestic 
borrowers in retail markets was indeed a direct consequence of the illiquidity prevailing in 
money and capital markets. Put another way, as Bryan and Rafferty (2013) have it, if the 
markets could not provide the liquidity to keep the circulations of finance in motion, then it 
appeared that central banks had little choice but to rip up their rulebooks to provide liquidity 
as a ‘public good’. 
 
The first year or so of the crisis also saw the enactment of a number of governance initiatives, 
in the USA in particular, that turned on a spatial imaginary that envisioned the speculative 
circulations of the capital markets in a related but somewhat different manner. When the 
Federal Reserve acted to save Bear Stearns in March 2008 and American International Group 
(AIG) in November 2008, and when the US Treasury unveiled the Troubled Assets Relief 
Programme (TARP) at the height of the crisis in September 2008, the technical problem to be 
governed was said to be one of ‘toxicity’. Sub-prime assets, now illiquid and thus impossible 
to value, were commonly referred to as ‘toxic assets’, ‘toxic refuse’, and ‘toxic waste’. This 
marked something of a departure from previously prevailing descriptions of failing assets as 
‘junk’, and as that which could be merely discarded without consequence. Assets that were 
‘toxic’, in contrast, were poisonous to those that held them.  The supposed solution was to 
create ‘bad banks’. This was a form of crisis management that drew on two previous crisis 
governance experiments: the 1989 Resolution Trust Corporation, created in response to the 
21 
 
US Saving and Loans debacle; and the aptly named Retiva and Securum bad banks that were 
established in 1992 in response to the Swedish banking collapse. The aim of the bad banks 
created in the global financial crisis was to take toxic assets temporarily out of circulation, 
thereby making it possible for markets to return to the norm of price discovery necessary for 
the circulation of transferable claims. 
 
Talk of toxicity replaced the hydraulic and watery qualities of financial flows with an 
altogether more embodied spatial imaginary of circulation. The description of assets as 
‘toxic’ called-up the long-standing representation of money and finance as the blood of the 
economy-body (Johnson 1966; Mann 2010b; Simmel 2004: 474). It thus appeared that the 
cardiovascular financial system of the economy-body had been momentarily poisoned, a 
vision drawing sustenance from the medical etymology of the term ‘crisis’ and the related 
tendency to represent the financial crisis itself through an array of analogies with contagious 
diseases (Peckham 2013). It followed that the necessary solution was a set of ‘bad bank’ 
interventions akin to a purification or dialysis of the financial bloodstream. What was also 
notable, moreover, were the various ways in which siphoning-off toxic assets was explicitly 
represented as a move which would prevent the infection from spreading to the rest of the 
economy, endangering life itself. For example, when explaining Bear Stearns’ bad bank to a 
Senate committee in April 2008, then-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Timothy Geithner (2008), stated that ‘if this dynamic continues unabated’ without ‘a forceful 
policy response’, then ‘the consequences’ would include ‘higher borrowing costs for housing, 
education, and the expenses of everyday life’ and ‘lower value of retirement savings’. 
Similarly, in the televised address to the nation he delivered when the TARP proposals were 
before Congress, President George W. Bush (2008) stressed that ‘This rescue effort is not 
aimed at preserving any individual company or industry. It is aimed at preserving America’s 
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overall economy’. For Bush, it was clear that ‘our entire economy is in danger’, and that the 
costs of inaction would be high: 
 
… without immediate action by Congress, America could slip into a financial panic 
and a distressing scenario would unfold. More banks could fail … The stock market 
would drop even more, which would reduce the value of your retirement account. The 
value of your home could plummet … Even if you have good credit history, it would 
be more difficult for you to get the loans you need to buy a car or send your children 
to college.   
 
Bush’s televised address left viewers in little doubt that toxic assets were a problem for the 
American way of life, and that the TARP provided the solution to that problem. As he later 
put it (in Politi 2008), the TARP was required ‘for the financial security of every American’. 
 
As the crisis deepened in the autumn of 2008, the technical and circulatory problem to be 
addressed by crisis management was rendered differently yet again. Now it seemed that the 
critical issue was the solvency of banking which, in popular parlance, was ‘under water’ and 
in need of ‘bailout’. The action apparently required to restore the solvency of banking thus 
appeared to be ‘recapitalisation’, and not the ‘nationalisation’ that these actions were also 
recognised as carrying forward. Enacted through various sovereign treasury programmes on 
either side of the Atlantic during 2008 and 2009, the bailouts were figured through a spatial 
imaginary that envisioned the credit flows of commercial banking as particularly crucial to 
contemporary, Anglo-American life (Langley 2015: 97-99). Of particular interest to us here, 
however, is the content of the ensuing interventions which centred on the regulation of 
banking. The problem in this respect was widely held to be that so-called ‘permissive’, ‘lax’ 
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and ‘light-touch’ regulation prevailing prior to the crisis had enabled commercial banks to 
become ‘too big to fail’ through excessive risk-taking in wholesale markets. In the terms that 
travelled through political and media circles in the UK and in the wake of the bailout of 
Royal Bank of Scotland in particular, banks had not been concentrating on their ‘core 
business’ of lending to businesses and families, and instead had become embroiled in ‘the 
casino’ of speculative circulations (e.g. Turner 2009: 94; The Guardian 2010).  
 
A spatial imaginary that differentiates between types of financial flows – contrasting the 
apparently steady saving and lending of commercial banking with the reckless and rash 
gambling of the markets – was also a feature of US regulatory responses to the Wall Street 
Crash of 1929, most notably the Banking Act (known as the Glass-Steagall Act) of 1933. 
Given impetus by the Pecora Hearings, the Banking Act of 1933 was carried through 
Congress by former Treasury Secretary, Carter Glass, and then-Chairman of the House 
Banking and Currency Committee, Henry B. Steagall. While it also created the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the legislation was especially significant in the way that it 
condemned universal banking and firmly divided deposit-taking commercial banks from 
investment banks. Glass in particular had become the spokesman for a period in popular 
culture marked by revulsion at the so-called ‘madhouse’ of Wall Street during the roaring 
‘twenties (Fraser 2005: 367). As President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously put in at his 
inauguration speech in March 1933, ‘Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand 
indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men’ (in 
Chancellor 2000: 220). The spatial imaginary that differentiated between financial flows in 
the US in the wake of the Wall Street Crash was thus one in which the speculative 
circulations of stock markets posed a security threat to valued life, and accordingly the 
excesses of the markets were to be curtailed and prohibited.   
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The headline regulatory interventions in the USA and UK in the recent global financial crisis   
– namely, the ‘Volcker rule’ included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of late 2010, and the ‘Vickers’ ring-fence’ which, emerging from the 
Independent Commission on Banking report in 2011, featured in the Banking Reform Act of 
2013 – were certainly similar to the Glass-Steagall Act. Indeed, Paul Volcker, the former 
head of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve who was the driving force behind the 
regulation that bears his name, certainly took inspiration from Carter Glass, and the Volcker 
rule was often referred to in media and policy circles as ‘Glass-Steagall lite’. Yet, as they 
sought to specify the permissible practices of banks across the domains of financial flows that 
they differentiated, the Volcker rule and the Vicker’s ring-fence did not condemn and curtail 
speculative circulations. Rather, certain wholesale market circulations deemed high-risk and 
casino-like were positioned at one remove from deposit-taking banks. While the flow of 
credit from commercial banking thus appeared to provide the financial essentials of life, 
speculative circulations nonetheless continued to be imagined as crucial to securing wealth 
and wellbeing.    
 
Conclusions 
 
Money moves, finance flows. And, as stressed by classical and contemporary social scientific 
research conducted from a wide range of perspectives, circulation is crucial to the very nature 
and existence of money and finance. As Georg Simmel asserts (2004: 571), for example, 
‘when money stands still, it is no longer money according to its specific value and 
significance’. It is clearly no surprise, then, that money and finance are replete with popular 
terminology, figures of speech, metaphors and maps that provide these circulatory 
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geographies with spatial imaginaries. To date, however, research which draws attention to the 
significance of representations of the movements of money and finance concentrates on how 
they obscure certain underlying or arguably more telling dynamics. With reference to 
financial flows specifically, the task for critical analysis would seem to be one of eschewing 
prevailing imaginaries – especially as they suggest productive inflows into the ‘real 
economy’ – and of proposing an alternative envisioning capable of bringing the uneven, 
volatile and/or speculative qualities of circulations to the fore.  
 
In contrast, and in the context of previous social science that underlines that the geographies 
of financial markets are marked by speculative circulations, this chapter's first motivation is 
to ask how the generative force of spatial imaginaries might be understood in conceptual 
terms. While extant research opens up a number of conceptual routes to considering the 
production and reproduction of speculative circulations – from class and state power to the 
complex concentrations of embodied work, knowledge and calculation in global financial 
centres, for example – it largely neglects the role of spatial imaginaries. The chapter takes 
inspiration from Georg Simmel’s (2004) attention to the symbolic meanings and associations 
necessarily attached to money in circulation, and to how the very idea of money is crucial to 
the making of a particular modern and urban ‘style of life’. From Allen and Pryke’s (1999) 
extension of Simmel’s concepts in their analysis of derivatives markets, and through recourse 
to Foucault’s (2007, 2008) account of the biopolitical mode of power and security, the 
chapter offers an approach for understanding how prevailing spatial imaginaries contribute to 
the constitution of contemporary speculative circulations. 
 
The second motivation for the chapter is analytical and political in character. The omission of 
the generative force of spatial imaginaries from critical understandings of speculative 
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circulations certainly presents a conceptual problem. But this omission is perhaps only of 
wider significance because of the highly-mediated representations of ‘the markets’ and their 
mobilities that, especially in present-day popular culture in the USA and UK, envision 
financial flows as vital and essential to the contemporary, neoliberal style of life. The analysis 
offered here illuminates and explores the presence of spatial imaginaries of speculative 
circulations in the rendering and governing of the recent global financial crisis. This includes 
how the crisis was made-up and managed as the technical problems of ‘liquidity’ in money 
markets, ‘toxicity’ in capital markets, and the regulation of ‘casino’ practices in banking. 
What this shows, moreover, is that the spatial imaginaries of financial flows at work in the 
governance of the global financial crisis did not necessarily deny the speculative character of 
circulation. The markets and banks that were being saved from themselves through 
unprecedented liquidity injections, bad banks, bailouts and the like were not solely 
envisioned as the source of flows necessary for the operation of the ‘real economy’. 
Speculative circulations were also deeply implicated in securing wealth and wellbeing of the 
population because of the entrepreneurial opportunities they apparently afford.  
 
Giving conceptual and analytical consideration to the constitution of speculative circulations 
through spatial imaginaries thus sheds some fresh light on what is one of the principal and 
pressing political questions provoked by the recent global financial crisis: why, despite the 
magnitude of the ruptures experienced during the crisis, has global finance emerged largely 
unscathed, with its speculative circulatory excesses intact? Or, as French and Leyshon (2010) 
put it, why has the crisis proved to be such a terrible waste for progressive politics? This is 
not to claim, of course, that existing critical social scientific research into money and finance 
does not also provide useful vantage points from which to consider this question. It would 
indeed seem fair to conclude that class and state power have ensured that global finance 
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remains very much open for business, and that the expert knowledge networks centred on 
Wall Street and the City of London have largely continued to define the ‘anti-political’ (Barry 
2002) calculative market terrain upon which debate takes place. What recognising the 
generative force of spatial imaginaries suggests, however, is a somewhat different conclusion. 
It is also a conclusion that is, arguably, a more disturbing one. Prevailing and highly-
mediated spatial imaginaries stymie popular debate and disagreement over the freedoms of 
speculative circulations in what are typically reified as ‘the markets’ (see also Christophers 
2015). In doing so, they also forestall the emergence of what William Connolly (2002) calls a 
genuinely pluralist and ethical politics, and a society in which asset holders and prime 
borrowers would call into question their own identities and the personal security that 
speculative circulations supposedly produce.            
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